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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Frank J. Tankovich, appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence
against him for Malicious Harassment, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-204, and
Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-7901
pursuant to the District Court's Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence
thereon. (R. 715-719).

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Appellant Frank J. Tankovich was charged with Malicious Harassment, a felony,
I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-204, and Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Harassment, a felony,
I.C. §§ 18-7902, 18-7901 by way of Indictment filed November 2, 2009
ultimately Third Amended Indictment filed April 26, 2010.

\:~

?9-31), and

(R. 390-392).

Those

indictments alleged that Mr. Tankovich, maliciously and with specific intent to intimidate
or harass another person because of that person's race, threaten said person, and that
Mr. Tankovich conspired with his brothers William and Ira Tankovich to commit that said
crime.
Factually, the State alleged: (1) that Ira Tankovich, and/or the codefendants, on
August 16, 2009, made contact with a Mr. Requenta, (2) that on thSlt same day, Ira
Tankovich returned to Mr. Requenta's home with a firearm, and; (3) on that same day,
after Ira Tankovich and/or the others had made contact with Mr. Requenta, William
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Tankov[ch, Jr., and Frank Tankovich (defendant herein), returned to Mr. Requenta's
home and maliciously and with specific intent to intimidate or harass Mr. Requenta due
to race or color, etc., made disparaging racial remarks to Mr. Requenta and threatened
him by word or act to cause him physical injury, giving Mr. Requenta reasonable cause
to believe the action threatened would occur. (R. 39-40, 391).
Upon motion by the State, the District Court joined the matters for trial, subject to
consideration of any application for relief from prejudicial joinder. (R. 64-65).
Mr. Tankovich twice moved to sever the trials under J.C.R. 14.

:R.

69-71, 99-

107, 520-521). The District Court denied those motions. (Tr. Pg. 174, Line 13 - Pg.
175, Line 18, Tr. Pg. 1531, Line 9 - Pg. 1534, Line 6).
Mr. Tankovich also objected to the State's motions in limine to allow evidence of
the tattoos previously discussed into the case against him, and expert testimony
regarding the same. (R. 79-80, 508-11). The District Court allowed the evidence and
expert testimony. (Tr., Pg .. 176, Line 8 - Pg. 181, Line 15).
The matter went to a first trial that ended in a mistrial due to prosecutorial
misconduct and legal defect in the proceeding preventing a fair trial. (1';, Pg. 455, Line
1 - Pg .. 456, Line 17).
The matter then went to a second trial that ended again in mistrial,

~his

time due

to hung jury. (Tr. Pg. 1467, Lines 1 - 20).
The matter went to trial again, at which time Frank Tankovich was convicted, and
ultimately judgment and sentence was entered and suspended. (R. 715 - 719).
Mr. Tankovich timely filed his appeal.

?

II.
ISSUES

A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Sever trials?
B. Did the District Court err by allowing testimony and evidence of the tattoos
borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants?
C. Did the District Court err by allowing expert testimony regarding the same
tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants?
D.
Did the District Court err by failing to dismiss the case against Frank
Tankovich?

Ill.
ARGUMENT

A. The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motions to

~0\f"er

Trials.

An abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a motion
to sever pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was
proper in the first place. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007). Idaho
Criminal Rule 14 provides the mechanism for relief from prejudicial joinder of trials.
That rule states that if it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by the joinder of
offenses or defendants for trial together, the court may, among other remedies, grant
separate trials.
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the

boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted
from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903,
908, 55 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2002). In cases such as this, Idaho appellate courts
review the trial proceeding to determine whether one or more of the followi;1g "potential
sources of prejudice" appeared: (a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and
cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the
potential that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (c) the
possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find
him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her criminal disposition, i.e. he or
she is a bad person. Id.
It is Mr. Frank Tankovich's position that the joinder of his trial

wi~h

the trials of his

codefendants, Ira and William Tankovich, was prejudicial to his case, due to the
evidence of tattoos borne by the codefendants, and the expert witness testimony
offered by the State regarding those tattoos. This evidence is offered hy the state to
show motive or intent. Frank Tankovich does not have any tattoos. Therefore, neither
the evidence of the tattoos, nor the expert testimony regarding the tattoos, should have
been admitted in his case.
The District Court itself recognized the problems in the case. At sentencing,
Judge Luster noted that he had some serious reservations regarding whether the case

4

was about race, or really about traditional malicious harassment. (Tr. Fg. 2330, Line 17
- Pg. 2332, Line 2). The District Court there noted that in its view it w(luld be just as
reasonable to conclude that the statements uttered were uttered in anger over a gun
having been pointed at the defendants as about race. The District Court further noted
that if the case had been tried to him, the result would have been different. (Tr. Pg.
2334, Lines 16 -14).
Given that the strength of the case was that tenuous, the prejudice suffered by
Frank Tankovich by being tried along with other individuals bearing alleged racist
tattoos, and having evidence of those tattoos, including expert testimony emphasizing
the tattoos, is quite evident. Leaving Frank Tankovich's case joined with the others
leads to the danger that the jury would cumulate the evidence, including that of the
tattoos, against Frank Tankovich, and that Frank Tankovich would be confounded in
presenting his defenses, given that his case was filled with testimony and evidence
regarding allegedly racist tattoos that he did not own or bear.
Given that the District Court called the case problematic, that had the case been
tried to him he would not have convicted, that one jury hung 11 to 1 regarding Count 1
favoring acquittal, and 8 to 4 regarding Count 2 favoring acquittal, (Tr. Pg. 1470, Line
22 - Pg. 1471, Line 19), the record demonstrates that Frank Tankovich was unfairly
prejudiced such that joinder prevented him from having a fair trial. Thus, the District
Court erred by denying severance.
B. The District Court erred by allowing testimony and evidence of the tattoos
borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants.
Mr. Tankovich moved to exclude evidence of the tattoos borne by li"a Tankovich
and William Tankovich. (R. 386 - 388). Ira Tankovich had a tattoo that included the

words "Aryan Pride", and an eagle on his back. (R. 100,386). William Tankovich had a
tattoo that included lightning bolt

"ssn

markings that were alleged to be Nazi type

symbols. (R. 100, 386). The State sought to introduce the evidence of the above
symbols, borne by codefendants, as evidence of state of mind, motive and intent
concerning Mr. Frank Tankovich, and or concerning a conspiracy between the three
codefendants (R. 73-74). However, Frank Tankovich does not have any such tattoos.
Frank Tankovich contends that the fact that two other individuals vvhom he was
with have tattoos of whatever kind is in no way probative regarding his state of mind,
whether it be for proving his state of mind, or the existence of a conspiracy. Frank
Tankovich cannot be held responsible for the tattoos borne by other individuals.
Therefore, because the existence of tattoos on the bodies of codefendants does
not have any tendency to make anything concerning the mind of Frank Tankovich state
more or less probable, said evidence was not relevant in Frank Tankovich's case.
I.R.E. 401.

Moreover, even if the District Court did not abuse its discretion under J.R.E 401 in
allowing the evidence of the tattoos, such evidence is legally irrelevant as against Frank
Tankovich because its probative value regarding his state of mind and/or the existence
of a conspiracy was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, coni;'ision of the
issues or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403. To the extent the fact that other individuals
have tattoos that have Nazi or white supremacist associations bears any remote
relationship to the state of mind of Frank Tankovich, or the existence of a conspiracy
between the three defendants, such evidence is unfairly prejudicial against a man who
does not have such tattoos on his body. Frank Tankovich did not put such symbols on

his body.

That others did does not say anything useful that is not dangerously

outweighed by the prejudice or confusion risked by allowing such evidem'''?
The State argued, and the District Court questioned, how this was different from
a case where during a robbery two defendants covered their faces with bandanas and
one did not. (Tr. Pg. 60, Line 8 - Pg. 62, Line 7).
In fact, a logical distinction exists. With bandanas being worn as masks, the
other defendants are using a piece of cloth as a tool to accomplish a crime by hiding
their identities. In this case, the other defendants have tattoos that might or might not
express an opinion or evidence a belief held by the person bearing the tattoo. The
tattoos are not tools used to accomplish the crime. There is no eviden(;e in the record
stating that the alleged victim observed the tattoos or was intimidated by them or that
the tattoos were used to commit the crime or form a conspiracy.

Therefore the

existence of tattoos on the bodies of codefendants is not at all the same as bandanas
being worn by codefendants to accomplish a crime.
To the extent that said tattoos says anything about the state of mind of the
person bearing the tattoo, it does not follow that Frank Tankovich shared the opinion.
Even if there is some remote possibility that the tattoos on another man say anything
about Frank Tankovich, that possibility is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice and confusion.

The evidence should have been excluded from Frank

Tankovich's case.

C. The District Court erred by allowing expert testimony regarding the same
tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants.
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The State offered the testimony of Tim Higgins, a former corrections employee,
as an expert witness concerning the symbols associated with white supremacist gangs
and groups. (R. 494-498). The State contended that Mr. Higgins' testimony would aid
the jury in "understanding the defendants' tattoos." (R. 496).
Frank Tankovich contends that admission of the purported 0xpert testimony
added to the prejudice of allowing evidence regarding tattoos borne by others into the
case against him. and further invaded the province of the jury with regar.::

!(l

what those

tattoos meant or how they were significant, especially as concerning him. who had no
tattoos.
All the discussion regarding what the tattoos meant concerned what a jury would
think about "S8" symbols or "bolts", and what they indicate. The State contended that
Mr. Higgins would testify that bearing such tattoos indicated white supremacy gang
membership. (R. 497). The problem is that those symbols were not borne by Frank
Tankovich, and therefore are not indicative of his beliefs or associations, or regarding
his motives on the day in question. He objected to the proposed eVidence. (R. 509-

511).
Additionally, the other tattoo included the words "Aryan Pride". Expert testimony
was not necessary for the purpose of aiding the jury in what those words mean. The
words speak for themselves, to the extent they say anything at all with regard to an
issue in the case. However, to the extent they are probative, they are probative only as
to their owner. not to another individual, including Frank Tankovich.
Rather, again, said testimony does not illuminate or assist the jury with regard to
Frank Tankovich's beliefs, mindset, associations or any other material fact in question.

Instead, said testimony only added to the prejudice of allowing the 8\:ldence of the
tattoos borne by other individuals into Frank Tankovich's case in the first place.
Although the District Court instructed the jury not to consider the expert testimony as
against Frank Tankovich, (Tr. Pg. 2124, Lines 12 - 23), the prejudice was nonetheless
compounded. Instead of aiding the jury, the testimony added to the unfair prejudice and
confusion created by allowing the evidence of the tattoos borne by the other charged
individuals in the case against Frank Tankovich. I.R.E. 403.
D.

The District Court erred by failing to dismiss the case against Frank

Tankovich due to insufficient evidence.
The case against Frank Tankovich did not contain sufficient evidefice upon which
the jury could convict. Where the evidence at trial is insufficient to support a jury's
finding of guilt, the court must overturn the verdict. State v. Herrera-Bnte, 131 Idaho
383,385,957 P2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998).
Here, as argued previously, the District Court itself recognized the problems in
the case. Judge Luster noted that he had some serious reservations regarding whether
the case was about race, or really about traditional malicious harassment. (Tr. Pg.
2330, Line 17 - Pg. 2332, Line 2). He also stated that in his view it would be just as
reasonable to conclude that the statements uttered were uttered in anger over a gun
having been pointed at the defendants as about race. The Court furthel" noted that if the
case had been tried to him, the result would have been different (Tr. Pg. 2334, Lines
16 - 14).
Given that the strength of the case was that tenuous, the prejudice suffered by
Frank Tankovich by being tried along with other individuals bearing alleged racist

tattoos, and having evidence of those tattoos, including expert testimony emphasizing
the tattoos, was stronger than the evidence in the case. Leaving Frank Tankovich's
case joined with the others leads to the danger that the jury would cumulate the
evidence, especially that of the tattoos, against Frank Tankovich, and that Frank
Tankovich would be confounded in presenting his defenses, given that his case was
filled with testimony and evidence regarding allegedly racist tattoos that !:f> did not own
or bear and which were not displayed during the incident. The other facts in evidence
demonstrate an angry confrontation during which the alleged victim puiled a gun and
pOinted it at the defendants. Though Frank Tankovich may have yelled some angry
statements, the evidence of racial intent is extremely deficient, especially when
considered without the tattoo evidence, which should not have been allowed.
Given that the District Court noted that the case was problematic and that had
the case been tried to him, he would not have convicted, that one jury hung 11 to 1
regarding Count 1 favoring acquittal, and 8 to 4 regarding Count 2 favoring acquittal,
(Tr. Pg. 1470, Line 22 - Pg. 1471, Line 19). the record is strong that Frank Tankovich
was unfairly prejudiced by failing to sever his case in a manner that prevented him from
having a fair trial and by having his case full of testimony and evidencb i)t-)out tattoos
that he did not possess or bear. The evidence otherwise in the case

\;V~S

not sufficient

for the jury to convict. Therefore, Frank Tankovich respectfully requests that the Court
overturn the jury's verdict against him.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Tankovich respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial
of his motion to sever, and reverse his objections to evidence about other individuals'
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tattoos, including the expert testimony allowed, that his conviction also bt:"' reversed, and
the matter remanded for further proceedings.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2012.

---.-EN D. THOMPSON
Conflict Appellate Public Defender
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